Many jurisdictions award pain and suffering damages, yet it is difficult for judges or juries to quantify pain. Several jurisdictions, such as California, cap pain and suffering damages or other noneconomic damages, and legal scholars have proposed ways to control such damages. Reforms and proposals, however, have been based on limited empirical evidence.
I. Introduction
Pain and suffering and other noneconomic damages awarded by courts have generated much normative and policy debate in the United States (see, e.g., Bovbjerg et al. 1988; Croley & Hanson 1995; Geistfeld 1995 Geistfeld , 2005 McCaffery et al. 1995; Viscusi 1996 Viscusi , 2007 Diamond et al. 1998; Vidmar et al. 1998; Niemeyer 2004; Avraham 2005 Avraham , 2006 Rabin 2005; Sharkey 2005; Sugarman 2006; Ubel & Loewenstein 2008) . Concerns about the unpredictability of damages have led to controversial caps on noneconomic damages, 1 such as the California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of 1975, 2 and to caps on punitive damages in many states (Miceli & Stone 2013:114-15) .
Statutes capping damages have generated much litigation under U.S. state constitutions (Love 2012) . Whether pain and suffering damages and other noneconomic awards are too capricious is also an important question in European legal systems (Karapanou & Visscher 2010a; Flatscher-Th€ oni et al. 2013 . In Taiwan, doctors have long contended that the medical malpractice law, which can lead to millions of Taiwan dollars (NTD) in pain and suffering damages, has caused the younger generation of doctors to choose high-profit and low-risk specialties, such as plastic surgery and dentistry, rather than surgery. The highest judicial authority in Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan, has commissioned a leading tort scholar to develop a regression model to help judges determine the amount of pain and suffering damages. In short, the stakes of assessing whether pain and suffering damages are reasonable and predictable are high. From the law and economics perspective, a prerequisite for the torts system to achieve optimal deterrence is setting damages at expected losses (if not the actual losses) of victims (Shavell 2004:240-43) . Nonetheless, even when willingness to pay/ accept is taken as the benchmark for quantifying pain and suffering, it is still difficult for judges to set expected losses accurately (for the difficulty of assessing the value of life, cf. generally Sunstein 2014:85-136) . As Shavell (2004:242) notes, in the case of nonpecuniary losses, the better approach is using simple tables or formulas to assess pain and suffering damages to save administrative costs. Indeed, Ramseyer's (2015:10-34 ) study on the Japanese torts system shows that because the Japanese Supreme Court uses publicly available tables to assess pain and suffering damages and court-published 1 For instance, 31 states have adopted caps on noneconomic damages or total damages in medical malpractice lawsuits (Paik et al. 2016) . Pain and suffering damages also are an instance of unbounded damages, which generate positively skewed award distributions (Kahneman et al. 1998; Guthrie et al. 2000) , which in turn lead to reform proposals (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1998). the exception of some sources used in Kritzer et al. (2014) and Cohen and Miller (2003) , the prior studies lack detailed information about pain and suffering and pecuniary damages. The major determinants of pain and suffering damages thus remain unclear.
Using randomly sampled cases from Taiwan, we provide two innovative analyses of pain and suffering damages. First, we obtained detailed breakdowns of damages categories and assessed their influences on pain and suffering damages. This unique dataset enables us to test empirical conjectures made by torts scholars that have not been able to be put to tests before. The observational research design does not allow us to make causal inferences. Yet showing correlation (or lack of) among certain important variables is an important step in further understanding the determinants of torts damages and a stepping stone for future scholars to design their researches to make causal inferences. We find that proxies of pain and suffering-medical expenses and the level of injury (minor vs. serious injury)-are associated with pain and suffering damages. The strength of the medical expenses correlation is important for two reasons. Medical expenses are inherently related to pain and suffering, and their association suggests a coherence to the damages system. In addition, medical expenses outperform other pecuniary components of damages in explaining pain and suffering. This is evidence of judges filtering out components of pecuniary damages that are less likely to be associated with pain and suffering. We also find that the victims' annual incomes, among other factors, were not influential. The absence of association with income is important because it avoids providing higher-paid workers with greater pain and suffering damages than lower-paid workers. Victims in medical malpractice cases tended to receive more pain and suffering damages than those in car accident cases, consistent with scholarly conjecture. Victims' ages are negatively correlated with pain and suffering damages in medical malpractice cases.
Second, our data include the amount of pain and suffering damages requested by plaintiffs. Using structural equation models that can control for the endogeneity problem, we find that as the plaintiffs' requests for pain and suffering damages increased, the judges awarded more.
Our Taiwan dataset is rare in being a non-U.S. source of pain and suffering damages information. We exploit these novel data by comparing the Taiwan results with analogous data from U.S. trial outcomes. We find little evidence that noneconomic damages form a higher percentage of total damages in the United States than in Taiwan. We do, however, present evidence that noneconomic awards, by both U.S. juries and judges, are higher per unit of economic damages than those in Taiwan, all by judges (as there is no jury system in Taiwan as of 2015). This research thus extends the prior pain and suffering literature to the study of career judges in a civil-law country.
The predictability of pain and suffering damages in a certain jurisdiction is not readily generalizable. A study on judicial behaviors, however, reveals patterns that other jurisdictions might share. We posit that judges endeavor to give rational awards but at the same time may be influenced by biases and heuristics. (A fuller explanation of our theoretical account of judges' behaviors will come in Section III.) The contribution of this article is to demonstrate the predictability of pain and suffering damages in a country where such damages are subject to judges' discretion. The judicial decisionmaking patterns revealed by our study could inform researchers in other countries with comparable torts damage systems.
Section II of this article describes Taiwan's law relating to pain and suffering damages. Section III addresses our hypotheses and methodology. Section IV reports and discusses our results. Section V addresses the results' relation to U.S. data, and Section VI concludes.
II. Taiwan's Pain and Suffering Damages Law
Pursuant to Articles 193 and 195 of the Taiwan Civil Code, victims of a tortious act can request the tortfeasor to pay pecuniary damages and pain and suffering damages. 4 For example, medical doctors can be liable to compensate a patient for both types of damages if they failed to diagnose the patient with cancer or other major diseases. Courts in Taiwan 5 break down damages in such cases into 10 subcategories, as shown in Table 1 .
We will occasionally use the labels in Table 1 to refer to damages types. No table or formula exists for courts to determine the amount of pain and suffering damages. The Civil Code provides no guidance. A few leading cases rendered by the Supreme Court of Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s declared that the following factors Judges in Taiwan are career judges who serve on the bench after passing a judiciary examination and receiving training for two years. As of December 2015, there is no jury system in Taiwan, though a pilot program on introducing a "lay observer system" is under way (Huang & Lin 2013). should be considered: the socioeconomic status, total assets, annual income, age, educational background, and the like of both sides, the plaintiff's level of pain and harm, the victim's negligence, the defendant's repentance, and so on. Other than these factors, no conventional wisdom or rules of thumb exist for quantifying pain and suffering to date. In practice, the plaintiff generally simply claims an amount and contends that it is just, with little supporting evidence. The court decisions usually start with a template discussion that carbon-copies the list of factors emphasized by the leading cases, 6 then summarize the facts of the case at hand, and award an amount at the end. As judges have never elaborated their formulas and rarely provided concrete information regarding the factors, it is doubtful to what extent those factors listed in the template arguments affect the final amount of pain and suffering damages. In other words, the factors prescribed by the Taiwan Supreme Court failed to enhance legal predictability.
7
Courts in Taiwan will review the receipts of all pecuniary expenses and only grant plaintiffs reasonable expenses. Due to the mandatory national health-care system that covers most medical treatments and medication, only medical expenses that are not covered by the health-care plans (such as co-payment, certain special medicines and operations, and domestic nursery care) can be recovered by the victim from the tortfeasor.
Plaintiffs do not have an incentive to claim unrealistically high amounts of pain and suffering damages. First, filing fees are proportional to the amount of claimed total damages (roughly, around 1 percent of the total claimed damages).
8 Second, the losing party has to pay filing fees. In a tort lawsuit, a plaintiff usually has to pay part of the filing fee if the court does not grant all her claims. The plaintiff generally has to pay [1 -(court award/plaintiff's claim)] 3 filing fee. Hence, claiming a high amount of pain and suffering damages increases both the filing fee and the probability of bearing a higher percentage of the filing fee. Nevertheless, plaintiffs expecting the return rate of overclaiming to be higher than 1 percent will still overclaim. 9 One important caveat:
when a plaintiff makes pain and suffering damages claims as part of the criminal proceedings against a defendant, and the defendant was found guilty, the plaintiff does not have to pay filing fees for her civil lawsuit in the court of first instance.
6
Not all courts use the same template. The factors that a court explicitly claims to take into account slightly differ.
7
In unreported tables, we explored the factors that Taiwanese courts purport to have considered in determining pain and suffering damages. The information provided in the written court decisions is often insufficient to detect meaningful association between those factors and the amount of pain and suffering damages. That is, aided by regression models, we still cannot ascertain whether these factors are statistically predictable.
8
Pursuant to Article 77-13 of the Civil Procedure Code of Taiwan, the filing fee is assessed in the following way: 1. A fixed fee of NTD 1,000 for any claim that is worth NTD 100,000 or less (>5 1 percent). 2. A 1.1 percent fee for the part of the claim that is above NTD 100,000 and no larger than NTD 1,000,000. 3. The filing fee rates decrease to 0.99 percent, 0.88 percent, 0.77 percent, and 0.66 percent, when the value of the claim hits the threshold of NTD 10 million, NTD 100 million, and NTD 1 billion, respectively. For all the cases in our dataset, the filing fee is slightly higher than 1 percent of the worth of the claims.
Taiwan can generally be considered a civil-law country. Almost all judges are career judges who may or may not have (most have not) practiced law before serving on the bench. Most jurists in Taiwan major in law as an undergraduate, and only a minority of jurists are trained in a JD-like graduate program. Jurists who pass the bar exam (its passing rate has always been below 11 percent) and finish six months of practical training are qualified to practice law. Jurists who pursue a career as judges or prosecutors have to take the court officer examination. Those who pass the examination receive training in the Academy for the Judiciary for two years. At the end of their training, based on their grades, preferences, and available openings, they will become judges or prosecutors. Judges are tenured, and thus presumably less influenced by external political influences. For civil matters, there are three levels of courts: district courts, appellate courts, and the supreme court. The former two can determine both questions of fact and questions of law, while the supreme court only deals with questions of law. Appealing to the appellate court is as of right, whereas large-stake cases represented by attorneys can be appealed to the supreme court, subject to its discretion (Eisenberg & Huang 2012; Chen et al. 2015) .
III. Hypothesis and Methodology

A. Major Research Questions
Our core empirical question is to identify the major determinants of court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages. Our dataset contains detailed information regarding the components of damages (in every case, we can break down total damages into 10 components; see Table 1 ). Hence, we can measure the association of pain and suffering damages with various factors holding others constant. Although we explore the association of several factors with pain and suffering damages, a purely kitchen-sink approach is not preferred. A behavioral theory of judicial decision making in nonpecuniary damages would inform the empirical strategy. Lack of demographic information about the judges prevents us from directly testing any demographic theory. We instead focus on how the victims' behaviors, characteristics, and litigation strategies affect the amount of pain and suffering damages.
Severity of Injury as Proxy for Pain and Suffering
Our first conjecture, based on discussions with dozens of judges in all three levels of courts in Taiwan, is that judges consciously base the amount of pain and suffering damages on the severity of injury. "Severity of injury" in this article represents an abstract standard that varies among judges and is not specified by any statute, regulation, or court precedent. Indeed, no criterion has been explicitly endorsed by any court decisions.
10 As long as judges make a common-sense judgment of severity of injury, the severity of injury shall be associated with certain quantifiable measures, such as medical 10 There are a few ways to measure percentage of lost earning capacity, as discussed below, but most cases in our dataset do not involve assessment of lost earning capacity. expenses and level of injury (minor vs. serious injury). Our first hypothesis is that both the medical expenses and level of injury are positively associated with pain and suffering damages.
The level of injury and medical expenses are our proxies for the severity of injury, not necessarily the judges'. Statistically significant and positive relations between these proxies and the amount of pain and suffering damages, however, would suggest that no matter which criterion judges used to render their decisions, the criterion must be highly correlated with our proxies. We use both proxies because a dummy variable capturing two levels of injuries is insufficiently sophisticated to capture the variety of injuries. Within each level of injury, the medical expenses, a continuous variable, serve to provide a more refined categorization of the severity of injury. Using medical expenses alone as a proxy, on the other hand, would fail to capture the categorical differences between a minor injury and a serious injury.
That the levels of injury and pain and suffering damages are positively correlated is empirically plausible 11 and should be justifiable, while the relation between medical expenses and pain and suffering damages is less obvious. Avraham (2006:112-14) conjectures that pain and suffering damages might be positively correlated with medical expenses (see also Epstein 1999:442; Flatscher-Th€ oni et al. 2013 ), but points out that the data available then only enabled researchers to test pain and suffering damages versus all kinds of pecuniary damages mixed together. Kritzer et al. (2014) provide a review of the relevant literature and a rare study of the relation between noneconomic damages and economic damages. They report a mixture of consistent and inconsistent patterns across multiple datasets. Kritzer et al. (2014:38) conclude that "there tends to be considerably more variability in the relationship between non-economic and economic damages than between punitive and compensatory damages." Our detailed data allow us to assess which subcategory of pecuniary damages is most strongly correlated with pain and suffering damages and test whether Avraham's (2006) conjecture is empirically valid. 12 The association should be normatively acceptable, to the extent that the medical expenses capture the severity of injury well (we do not have external criterion to verify this) and as long as the medical expenses in our dataset are not constrained by the income or wealth of the victim.
13
11 Vidmar et al. (1998:283, 296) adopt a nine-level injury classification used by U.S. National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and find a consistent relationship between the jury verdict awards and the level of injury in several jurisdictions in the United States. Flatscher-Th€ oni et al. (2013:110, 117 ) adopt the same injurylevel classification and find similar results in Austria.
12
Note that although pain and suffering damages in the United States could be assessed by judges or juries (see Section V), what Avraham (2006) has in mind might be jury awards. In this sense, our data on court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages in Taiwan cannot be used to test the claim. In Section V, though, we compare our Taiwan data with the U.S. data to shed light on this issue.
13
Summary statistics shown in Table 2 demonstrate that the medical expenses are not as high as a U.S. reader would guess, as the mean is USD 15,514 and the median is USD 2,904. The highest several medical expenses consist mostly of estimated future nursing care (E2). That means that at the time of litigation, the victim did not yet have to pay for it. Once the tortfeasor compensates the victim, the latter can afford to pay for the necessary nursing service.
Other Predictors
In addition to the level of injury, which we hypothesize to exert the most influence on the amount of pain and suffering damages, other factors may affect the assessed amount. Again, while we cannot establish causation with this research design, associations can be explored. Two predictors are explored here; others are discussed in Section IV.
First, a victim's age could be a predictor of pain and suffering damages, but theoretically it is unclear whether judges should take age into account. Avraham (2006:111) champions a system in which age is negatively correlated with pain and suffering damages, other things being equal, as permanent injuries produce more total pain for younger victims. Nonetheless, according to the adaptation theory (Bronsteen et al. 2008; Ubel & Loewenstein 2008:S198-S202; Ariely 2011:157-90) , most victims' happiness levels return to their preinjury stage, or at least rebound, after a few years (but see Huang 2008) . Hence, age is largely irrelevant for total pains. Although we cannot examine whether victims adapt, our data enable us to test whether judges consider age to be relevant to total pain. Second, adjudicators may use plaintiffs' future lost income as a reference point. If this is the case, white-collar workers would tend to receive more pain and suffering damages, although it is unclear whether high-wage earners suffer more pain than the low-wage earners for a given bodily injury, and whether the rich would need more compensation to ease their pain (Avraham 2006:114) . Pecuniary damages to property would be another example of dubious factors. In lawsuits involving car accidents, such a reference would give Lexus owners more pain and suffering damages than Toyota owners. Some prior empirical papers have found that objective losses positively correlated with pain and suffering damages. Hans and Reyna (2011:141) , using U.S. state court data, found that the amount of noneconomic damages is positively correlated with that of pecuniary damages. Other empirical studies have also found that jury-determined pain and suffering damages are often some multiple of the plaintiff's pecuniary losses or at least significantly correlated with the pecuniary losses (Bovbjerg et al. 1988; Viscusi 1988:210-11; Geistfeld 1995:787) .
14 The data used in these prior studies are not sufficiently refined to tease out the different effects of medical expenses and nonmedical expenses such as lost income and property damages.
Anchoring Effect by Plaintiffs' Claims
We do not assume that judges are always rational. Most judges would prefer to give reasoned decisions. Nevertheless, in tasks such as assessing pain and suffering damages, where a large amount of awards have to be determined without clear guidelines, judges might also be subject to the spell of heuristics. In other words, the court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages may not be entirely rational. Psychological experiments have shown that, other features held constant, the higher the requested amount of compensation (the ad damnum clause), the higher the jury verdict (Campbell et al. 2014) . This is the well-known anchoring effect (Ariely 2008:25-48; Kahneman 2011:119-28) . 15 That is, another number, even an arbitrary or irrelevant one, might influence the amount of pain and suffering damages. In a tort lawsuit that leads to awards of pain and suffering damages, several numbers exist and potentially become anchors. We submit that the plaintiff's requested amount of pain and suffering damages is more likely than other amounts to serve as an anchor. Plaintiffs' requested amounts are directly related to the issue. Thus, before a judge turns to how much pain and suffering damages to award, she would need to remind herself of the requested amount (as her adjudicated amount cannot surpass the requested amount). This makes the requested amount more likely to anchor a judge's decision. Our hypothesis is that as judges have to determine a number without legislative guidance, plaintiffs' requests, holding constant other variables, have a substantial, statistically significant, and positive effect on the pain and suffering award. This empirical examination has strong policy implications. Plaintiffs in a handful of states in the United States are not allowed to bring up the ad damnum clause (Franklin et al. 2008:299 ). Yet in many other states, plaintiffs can specify a dollar amount, on the assumption that juries or judges are free to regard it as irrelevant (Diamond et al. 2011:150-52) . The existence of the anchoring effect in the real (legal) world would suggest that the effect is too strong for judges and juries to resist and that the current practice of assessing pain and suffering damages is not normatively flawless.
A caveat is in order. Judges are likely to be influenced by meaningful and meaningless anchors (Rachlinski et al. 2006) , but most literature focuses on the meaningless anchors, whereas the experimental researches that study meaningful anchors are able to isolate the effect of meaningful anchors by holding other factors strictly constant. In an observational study like ours, it is difficult to control for everything. Although, as elaborated below, the structural equation model used can control for the endogeneity problem, the plaintiffs' requested amount of pain and suffering damages itself contains both the meaningful and meaningless parts-the former reflect the true pain and suffering while the latter capture the exaggeration. Yet we have no reliable method to tease out the portions of these two parts. Hence, even when the plaintiff claim variable is statistically significant, we do not know which parts drive the result. The strongest claim we can make is only that the statistically significant result is consistent with the experimental literature in finding an effect of meaningless anchors.
B. The Data
All civil cases decided by the district courts in Taiwan since 2000 are available for download on the official website of the judicial administration (Judicial Yuan) of Taiwan.   16   15 For introduction to the anchoring effect in law, see, e.g., Teichman and Zamir (2014) . Other legal studies that found the anchoring effect in legal settings include Guthrie et al. (2000) , Wistrich et al. (2005) , and Rachlinski et al. (2007) .
Using carefully chosen keywords, 17 we limited the district court cases yielded by our search to ones the plaintiff won and ones rendered between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2012. The research period was chosen because other research teams in Taiwan have collected data on similar issues before 2008 and are collecting data on similar issues resolved in appellate courts. Our data thus fill in a potential data gap. Moreover, we focus on decisions by the court of first instance. As emphasized by Guthrie et al. (2007:4) and Eisenberg and Heise (2015) , most cases are handled by the court of first instance. Many of these decisions are final in that they are not appealed. Such cases avoid the selection issues that arise in studying appellate cases, for example, the parties' decisions to appeal and settle cases pending appeal. Small claim and summary proceeding cases are excluded because the judgments in these cases usually do not contain enough information about the cases. We searched for and coded pain and suffering damages cases related to personal injury. Death cases were excluded because they are doctrinally and substantively different. 18 We limited our search to two types of tort cases-medical malpractice and car accident-to focus on negligent (rather than intentional) infringements that have similar background facts within the categories. Medical malpractice is a hotly debated tort issue in many jurisdictions, whereas car accident cases are numerous and thus not trivial. After irrelevant cases were filtered out, 19 44 medical malpractice cases that ended with an award of positive pain and suffering damages were found and coded. By contrast, more than 3,000 car accident cases showed up in our search. We coded a random sample of one-tenth of the car accident cases. To assure geographic representation of the whole country, we stratified the sample by judicial district to obtain 10 percent of car accident cases from each of the 20 jurisdictions. This resulted in 297 car accident cases in our dataset. A few cases have multiple plaintiffs. In 18 of the 341 observations, victims were in persistent vegetative state. Scholars and judges may have very different views regarding whether these victims should be awarded pain and suffering damages or how much discount or premium should be given to them. We thus omit these 18 observations from the following analysis. 20 The total number of observations is thus 17
The search terms are, of course, in Chinese and hard to translate. The literal translation of the search terms for car accident cases are: (road traffic OR traffic accident OR car accident NOT state responsibility) AND (Article 195 OR Article 194) AND (defendant pays OR defendants jointly pay). The literal translation of the search terms for medical malpractice cases are: (medical dispute OR medical incident OR medical malpractice) AND (defendant pays OR defendants jointly pay).
18
Under Taiwan law (Civil Code Art. 194), claimants for pain and suffering damages in death cases are the deceased party's spouse, children, and parents, not the deceased party's estate or heir. Also, in death cases, the deceased party may neither experience long pain and suffering nor spend on medical expenses.
19
In some cases, the plaintiffs did not request pain and suffering damages. Our search terms also capture cases in which the tort victims were dead---these cases are analyzed in Chang et al. (2015b). 20 In Section V, when comparing the Taiwan data with the U.S. data, we include the vegetative state cases, as there is no sufficient information to exclude this type of cases from the U.S. data.
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323.
21 Unreported regression analysis reveals that the results are essentially the same if these 18 observations are taken into account. We examined whether substantial differences in awards existed across 12 court districts. 22 There was no significant difference in the ratio of pain and suffering damages to non pain and suffering damages across the courts (Kruskal-Wallis p 5 0.33; ANOVA (natural log of ratio) p 5 0.19). 23 The absence of difference persisted when we subdivided the sample into car accident cases and medical malpractice cases. The absence of intercourt difference persisted when using the ratio of pain and suffering damages to total damages. As Figure 1 shows, the pain and suffering damages awarded in car accident cases by courts in Taiwan exhibit a somewhat bell-shaped distribution (after a natural log transformation) around USD 10,000. 24 The skewed distribution supporting the natural log transformation is typical of unbounded award outcomes. The pain and suffering damages in medical malpractice cases, if awarded at all, were no less than USD 3,333 (100,000 NTD). In all but three cases, courts in Taiwan awarded pain and suffering damages in multiples of 100,000 NTD. The most common amounts were 100,000, 150,000, 200,000, 300,000, 400,000, and 500,000 NTD. By contrast, court-adjudicated medical expenses ended with two or more zeroes in only 17 cases. This preference for round numbers in noneconomic damages is consistent with Hans and Reyna's (2011:133-37 ) gist-based model of juries. Table 2 provides selected summary statistics of the dataset. Panel A summarizes continuous variables and Panel B summarizes categorical variables. Car accident cases comprise 90 percent of the sample and medical malpractice cases 10 percent.
C. Regression Models
One-Equation Models
We report regression models that account for stratifying the sample by court district, the 10 percent sampling of car accident cases, and the nonindependence of observations in cases with more than one plaintiff. The dependent variable is the natural log of the judge's pain and suffering damages award. The independent variables control for types of 21 This gives us a large enough sample size for the structural equation model according to the conventional rules of thumb (such as a minimum sample size of 100 or 200, 5 or 10 observations per estimated parameter, and 10 observations per variable) (see generally Wolf et al. 2013) . 22 We combine 12 of the 20 courts to produce a set of four dummies for courts that have few observations. The combinations are based on geographic proximity and similarity in economic development. In total, (20 --12) 1 4 5 12 court districts were used.
23
In a regression model that accounts for the sample design, the p value is 0.49.
24
Throughout this article, the conversion rate is USD: Taiwan dollars 5 1:30. pecuniary damages, characteristics of both parties, and the nature of the tort action.
25 Year and court fixed effects are also included. The models take the following form:
where PSD is the natural log 26 of pain and suffering damages; INJURY reflects the severity of injuries; PEC are variables representing pecuniary damages in natural log form; Oren Bar-Gill suggests to us that whether the victim was present in the courtroom and whether the victim's injury is visible to the judge may affect the amount of pain and suffering damages. From the written decisions, we can hardly tell whether the victim was present. We interviewed a few attorneys and judges, and were informed that most attorney-represented victims do not show up in the courtroom. Although a few self-represented victims would try to show their scars to the judges, most plaintiffs rely on photos and medical reports to demonstrate their injuries because the tort lawsuits usually take place months after the accident, and most wounds would have healed. We go back to the written decisions and try to code a dummy variable on whether the injury would be visible, and it turns out that (at least part of) the injuries in almost all cases are visible. Therefore, we do not change our models. 26 We transform all damages and expenses into natural log forms to promote normality. Unreported regression models use un-logged damages and expenses, but the residuals exhibit heteroscedasticity, violating the assumption of OLS models. PL and DF are several variables capturing the characteristics of the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively; TYPE are a few variables controlling for the nature of the dispute, particularly the tortious acts; and Dt and Di are dummy variables indicating the years and court jurisdictions of the case, respectively. The coefficients to be estimated are b n ; e is an error term. We report robust standard errors clustered by cases. More specifically, INJURY includes a variable that is the natural log of courtadjudicated medical expenses, a dummy variable that equals 1 if court-adjudicated medical expenses are zero, and a dummy variable capturing whether the victims suffered from minor injuries (5 0) or serious injuries (5 1). Medical expenses include the costs of medicine, doctor visits, hospital expenses, medical devices, nursing care, and nutritious food (A1 1 A2 1 E1 1 E2). Expenses of nursing care are often higher than other subtypes of medical expenses combined in serious injury cases. Thus, medical expenses are more exactly "medical and caring expenses." For brevity's sake, we use medical expenses to refer to A1 1 A2 1 E1 1 E2.
Minor injuries and serious injuries are distinguished based on the standard stipulated in the Criminal Code of Taiwan. That is, a serious injury is one of the following conditions: 1. Destruction of or serious damage to the sight of one or both eyes; 2. Destruction of or serious damage to the hearing of one or both ears; 3. Destruction of or serious damage to the functions of speech, taste, or smell; 4. Destruction of or serious damage to the function of one or more limbs; 5. Destruction of or serious damage to the power of reproduction; and 6. Other serious injury to body or to health that is either impossible or difficult to cure.
PEC includes one variable, the natural log of nonmedical expenses, which is used in the first two regression models. Future lost salary (E3) is decomposed into three elements: "number of years of lost earning capacity" (using a square root transformation to promote normality), "plaintiff's annual income" (in natural log), and "percentage of lost earning capacity," 27 and they are used in one model.
PL includes a variable on the percentage of plaintiffs' contributory negligence (in our dataset, from 0 to 0.75) and a dummy variable on whether plaintiffs retain attorneys. A variable on plaintiffs' ages and a dummy variable indicating whether plaintiffs' ages are missing are included, as are an interaction term of plaintiffs' ages and a dummy variable on serious injury. In one model using only car accident cases, three more variables are used: 28 a dummy variable on whether the plaintiff drove a sedan or other motor vehicle such as a taxi and a truck; and two variables that distinguish whether the plaintiff was a pedestrian, passenger, or driver.
27
In some cases, victims lose working and earning capacity only for a few years. In the regression models, we use the three component variables of the future lost salary only if the victim loses part of the capability permanently (there are 64 such observations). 28 We have coded many details regarding the car accidents such as the vehicles used by plaintiffs and defendants during the accidents. We are not aware of any good theory that predicts whether these factors will or will not affect the judges' decisions. A lot of degrees of freedom would be consumed if all of these variables are included in models. We select these three variables based on least angle regression, a model-building algorithm that values parsimony as well as accuracy (Efron et al. 2004) . It is worth emphasizing that other variables in the models are chosen based on their theoretical importance.
DF includes the natural log of the number of natural-person defendants; a dummy variable for whether the defendants include a corporation; a dummy variable for whether the defendant is a minor and whether his/her parents are vicariously liable; a variable on the number of medical doctor defendants; and a dummy variable for whether the defendants are represented by attorneys. We also distinguish whether the party was a driver, a passenger, or a pedestrian.
29
TYPE includes a dummy variable that indicates whether it is a car accident case or a medical malpractice case; another dummy variable further distinguishes, in medical malpractice cases, whether doctors performed substandard treatments/operations or failed to diagnose a latent cancer/illness.
Dt is a series of dummy variables (one for each year) that controls the timing of the judgment. Di are a series of court dummy variables that control for the variance among jurisdictions.
We report four models. The first model uses both the car accident cases and medical malpractice cases. The second model uses only the car accident cases and adds a few variables to test whether the other facets of the accidents influence the damages awards. The third model uses only the car accident cases and, on the one hand, contains selected variables from the first model, but, on the other hand, adds three more variables related to victims' future lost salary. The fourth model uses only the medical malpractice cases. Due to the small number of observations, this final model is parsimonious, using only the few key variables. 
Structural Equation Model
Our data include the amount plaintiffs requested in pain and suffering damages. Such information has not been available in prior pain and suffering studies. Due to endogeneity, we do not include it in the above single-equation regression models. The requested amount is not independent of other explanatory variables such as medical expenses and level of injury. However, the requested amount is of obvious interest and potential importance. It might be expected to influence the awarded amount in two ways. First, higher requested amounts put higher numbers before the judge. Anchoring theory suggests that higher requested numbers will be associated with higher awarded numbers independently of the merits of an increased award. Second, higher requested amounts may be associated with factors that should increase awards but are not represented by observable variables in a single-equation regression model. The plaintiffs, in formulating the requested amount, may have access to information about the degree or 29 In unreported regression models, we also include the plaintiff's and defendant's annual incomes. There are many missing values for annual income of plaintiffs and defendants. Including these variables in the regression models would greatly reduce the number of observations and degrees of freedom. Thus we exclude them in the reported models. In unreported models, parties' incomes are not statistically significant in OLS and SEM models.
30
Plaintiffs' comparative negligence could not reasonably be included in Model (4) because it had a nonzero value in only one case. Recall that Model (4) is about medical malpractice, and naturally the plaintiff/patient is infrequently negligent.
nature of pain and suffering that we cannot observe. To account for the more complex relationship among the variables in models that include plaintiffs' requests and to control for the endogeneity problem, 31 Table 3 's models indicate that medical expenses are highly statistically significantly associated with pain and suffering damages (p < 0.001 in all but the last model). For Models (1), (2), and (4), a 1 percent increase in medical expenses is associated with about a 0.25 percent increase in pain and suffering damages. The first-row graphs in Figure 2 demonstrate that the quadratic fitted line for medical expenses and pain and suffering damages is almost straight, suggesting that the relation between the two logged variables is close to linear.
IV. Findings and Discussion
A. Medical Expenses and Level of Injury Best Explain Pain and Suffering Damages
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Unlike medical expenses, nonmedical pecuniary damages do not have statistically significant association with pain and suffering damages. Figure 2 provides a graphical exposition of the lack of association, particularly in the case of minor 31 An endogeneity problem occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term. If the "independent variable" is correlated with the error term in a regression model, the estimate of the regression coefficient in OLS regression may be biased. There are many methods of correcting the bias, including instrumental variable and structural equations regression. The models we are considering are known as a recursive system (Wooldridge 2010:228) ; the identification of these models is guaranteed. Endogeneity arises as a result of the recursive model specification. Using OLS for recursive systems does not give the most efficient estimates so better estimation methods are usually applied.
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Economists refer to models that combine explicit economic theories with statistical models as structural econometric models. The estimation method we are applying is called structural equations modeling (SEM). The results of the structural equations are estimated simultaneously by the Stata command "sem" (acronym for structural equation models) or "gsem" (acronym for generalized structural equation models). The term "generalized" is more like generalized linear models---that is, regression models for nonnormal data. This should not be confused with general linear models, which are for normal-distribution-based linear models with a full covariance matrix that is to be estimated along with the linear effects---these types of models include the two-stage least square model. An alternative is the two-stage least squares estimation; however, we use the SEM approach.
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Unreported regression models include a quadratic term, the square of natural log of medical expenses, but this variable is not statistically significant. injuries. 34 Regression results reported in Table 3 also corroborate with the figure. These findings underpin the conjecture that judges emphasize medical expenses over nonmedical expenses. The level of injury (minor injury or serious injury) is statistically significant, except in Model (4), which has only 33 observations, all medical malpractice cases. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients in Models (1)-(3) indicate that victims with serious injuries receive 52-65 percent more pain and suffering damages than those with minor injuries.
Note that Model (3) in Table 3 has many fewer observations than Model (2) since there are many missing values in the percent earning capacity lost, plaintiff annual income, Figure 2 : Scatterplots of court-adjudicated medical expenses (first row) and nonmedical pecuniary expenses (second row) versus pain and suffering damages. The lower bottom graph in Figure 2 may suggest that the relationship between natural log of pain and suffering damages and natural log of nonmedical pecuniary damages is quadratic. An unreported OLS model adds the square of the latter into Model (2) in Table 3 . Neither variable on nonmedical pecuniary damages is statistically significant. and years lost earnings variables. Only in the cases in which the victims ask for future lost salary would the court determine these factors. In addition, 38 of the 290 car accident cases have missing percent earning capacity lost, and the other two variables have a similar pattern. The composition of the missing and the nonmissing groups must be different and there may be some underlying selection. Since the regression models only include percent of earning capacity if it is permanent, the nonmissing group tends to have more serious injuries. In addition, victims in the nonmissing group tend to be working adults, not retirees or children. The main takeaway from Model (3) in Table 3 is that even within the nonmissing group, the effects of medical cost and injury level still dominate those of the percent earning capacity lost, plaintiff annual income, and years lost earnings.
Medical expenses and level of injury are highly associated, as shown in Figure 3 . The statistical significance of both the serious injury dummy variable and the medical expense variable suggest that when the medical expenses are the same, victims with serious injuries receive more pain and suffering damages than those with minor injuries. Also, within the injury category, higher medical expenses predict higher pain and suffering damages.
Note that medical expenses are unlikely to influence judicial decisions by being an anchor, as such expenses are a combination of several types of incurred and expected medically-related expenses. Their sums are not computed in the written judgments. That is, medical expenses are not one number (but several different numbers) for judges. That being said, as we discuss below, judges may still suffer from the anchoring effect (created by plaintiffs' claims) and may adjust the amount of pain and suffering damages according to factors that are normatively harder to justify. 
B. Accounting for Plaintiffs' Requested Pain and Suffering Damages
We now explore whether, in addition to the other influences on the pain and suffering award, the plaintiff's pain and suffering damages request is associated with the judge's pain and suffering award. We cannot meaningfully model the defendant's counterclaims concerning pain and suffering damages 35 due to their variety and lack of explicit amounts. 36 At least three reasons suggest that the request should be relevant. First, judges will not award more than the plaintiff's request. The request therefore caps the pain and suffering award and should be nonrandomly associated with it. Second, plaintiffs have an incentive to make reasonable pain and suffering requests because the filing fee increases as the requested amount increases. Third, the medical or other pecuniary damages that inform a pain and suffering request are known to the plaintiff, as are other intangible aspects of the case. Because the requested amount is not independent of other damages factors, we use a structural equation approach in which the structural equation includes the plaintiff's requested pain and suffering amount and an additional equation that models the plaintiff's requested amount as a function of objectively observable factors. Table 4 reports the results. The model accounts for the sample design, as described above.
The model is analogous to Table 3 's first model to facilitate comparing the effect of including the requested pain and suffering amount with a model that does not include the requested amount. The pain and suffering award equation uses key explanatory variables from Model (1) in Table 3 , but drops insignificant variables. The results of the structural equation model largely confirm what is found in the OLS model. The effects of plaintiffs' claims and attorney representation warrant more discussion.
Evidence for the Anchoring Effect
The award equation in the structural equation model shows a strong, significant association between the requested pain and suffering award and the actual pain and suffering award. This is evidence that the plaintiff's request, independent of objective measures of pain and suffering, is associated with the judge's pain and suffering award. The request equation models the plaintiff's requested pain and suffering damages. Rather than using court-adjudicated medical expenses, it uses the natural log of the plaintiff's claimed medical expenses, in addition to a dummy variable that equals 1 when such expenses are zero. The judge's award is not used as an explanatory variable because the award is unknown when the plaintiff makes a damages request. The presence of a lawyer for the defendant is not included in the model because the plaintiff does not know whether the defendant has a lawyer when the damages request is made. The request equation 35 Diamond et al. (2011:174) find that juries are less inclined to reject the defendant's claim than the plaintiff's claim.
shows that the request is significantly associated with other explanatory variables in the award equation. This is, of course, plausible since the same principal factors that influence the judge's award likely influence the plaintiff's request.
The association between a plaintiff's pain and suffering request and higher pain and suffering awards could be interpreted as evidence of an anchoring effect. 37 After objective measures of the qualitative nature of harm and the quantitative monetary loss are accounted for, the size of the requested amount remains associated with the judge's pain and suffering award. Absent an experimental setting, it is difficult to isolate a pure anchoring effect from other unobservable factors that may increase the judge's pain and suffering award. Thus, our finding is consistent with the psychological literature on anchoring, but it is not affirmative evidence that the anchoring effect exists in litigation.
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In the anchoring interpretation, judges are thought to follow the "anchor and adjust" procedure (Tversky & Kahneman 1974 :1128 . That is, judges use the plaintiff's request as the starting point and adjust it by taking into account medical expenses and other factors we found statistically significant. Judges, however, make insufficient adjustments and thus award plaintiffs with more pain and suffering damages than they otherwise would without the anchor.
The anchoring effect is normatively problematic. It increases legal unpredictability of damages awards (Avraham 2006:95) . Like cases are treated not alike simply because plaintiffs for whatever (often strategic) reasons claim higher. The existence of a possible anchoring effect also suggests that though judges have, overall speaking, done an admirable job in basing pain and suffering damages on factors that are highly relevant to the victims' pain, judges are still human, and they fall under the spell of anchors.
Attorney Influence
The model also suggests the mechanism through which lawyers may affect the judge's pain and suffering award amount. Table 2 shows that only 39 percent of plaintiffs had attorneys. The plaintiff having a lawyer is not significant in models of the pain and suffering award (Table 3) . Nonetheless, it is highly significant in the equation modeling the requested pain and suffering amount (Table 4 ). This suggests that the lawyer effect is indirect and not readily detected in single-equation models (such as Models (1) and (2) in Table 3 ). The presence of a plaintiff lawyer increases the request, which in turn increases the judicial award.
(A single-equation model that includes the pain and 37
This finding is consistent with the experimental result on the same issue reported in Chapman and Bornstein (1996) . But compare Diamond et al. (2011:174) , who find that juries in the Arizona Jury Project are more inclined to reject the plaintiff's request than the defendant's counterclaim, particularly regarding the pain and suffering damages. They conjecture that the general suspicion about plaintiffs may be at work there.
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One of us, using a more refined empirical strategy and a different dataset, tries to tease out the anchoring effect in real-world settings . We defer the job of identifying the anchoring effect outside the laboratory to that article. 39 Our finding of a positive association between pain and suffering recoveries and the presence of an attorney is consistent with O' Connell and Simon's (1972:23--24) finding such an association in automobile accident cases. Their early study lacked the specific controls available to us. suffering request yields results consistent with those in Table 4 ). The dummy variable on whether defendants retain attorneys is statistically significant in the OLS model reported in Table 3 , while it is not statistically significant in the structural equation model reported in Table 4 . One of us, in another paper, focuses on teasing out the effect of attorney representation and attorney experience in torts litigation ; thus, we will not go into further detail here.
Having a lawyer is associated with a higher requested damages amount. Nevertheless, having a lawyer is not in itself exogenous since lawyers may be sought in and attracted to cases with higher damages. To check the influence of the mechanism by which lawyers are selected, we used Stata's generalized structural equation modeling feature (the gsem command) to add equations modeling whether plaintiffs and defendants had lawyers. We assumed that the stakes of the case would be most influential to a lawyer's presence for plaintiffs. For the plaintiff lawyer equation, the explanatory variables we used were whether the plaintiff was seriously injured, the total damages other than pain and suffering, and the degree of the plaintiff's fault. For the defendant lawyer equation, we added to these variables whether the defendant was a corporation and whether the plaintiff had a lawyer. The results reported in Table 4 did not materially differ when these equations were added.
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C. Lost Income and Pain and Suffering
Cases in which victims request compensation for reduced earning capacity are an important subset of observations. For permanent reduction in earning capacity, courts usually award the victim a lump sum consisting of lost salary from the time of judgment to the mandatory retirement age, 41 discounted to present value. The compensation is mainly based on three factors:
years until retirement, current annual salary, and percentage of lost earning capacity. To determine the percentage, courts often rely on the "schedule of impairment" declared by a government agency for labor insurance purposes. 42 The annual salary is a matter of proof.
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One might expect that the percentage of reduced earning capacity would seriously compete with or supplement medical expenses and the level of injury as measures of victims' pain and suffering. The more one loses earning capacity, the more pain and suffering (due to the injury itself and the sense of fulfillment from working) one may incur. On the other hand, a bodily impairment that causes substantial suffering may not always reduce earning capacity. Losing an eye may be a case in point. Thus, in some cases, reduced earning capacity may be an inadequate proxy for pain and suffering. It is therefore of interest to address the relation between earnings and pain and suffering in more detail. Model (3) in Table 3 includes three measures of permanently reduced earning capacity: annual income, percentage of lost earning capacity, and years of lost earning capacity. The regression result shows that they do little to add to medical expenses and injury levels as an explanation of pain and suffering. Plaintiff being represented by a lawyer was significantly associated with serious injury. Defendant being represented by a lawyer was significantly associated with whether the plaintiff had a lawyer and whether the defendant was a corporation. 41 The mandatory retirement age was 60 years old before April 2008 and 65 years old since then.
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In 34 percent of the cases, courts explicitly refer to such a schedule. 43 In 56 percent of the cases, courts use the victim's actual preinjury salary. In 40 percent of the cases (usually with minor victims), courts use the minimum wage to calculate lost salary. 44 We have tried several other unreported model specifications, but the results are consistent: as long as the dummy variable representing injury levels and the medical expense variable are included in the regression models, none of the three variables regarding future lost salary are statistically significant. In unreported models, we have replaced the three component variables with one variable that captures the amount of total future lost salary. The result is essentially the same.
The insignificance of the three components of future lost salary is empirically unsurprising and normatively acceptable. Regarding annual income, utility theorists have posited how the utility of a given dollar changes when the rich become poor and when a healthy person is injured (see also Posner 2011:251-53 ). Yet before more solid empirical evidence of utility changes appears, judges can understandably regard the amount of salary as irrelevant to pain and suffering. 45 In addition, percentage of lost earning capacity is itself correlated with positive amount medical expenses (r 5 0.724; p < 0.001; N 5 59), which strongly correlate with pain and suffering damages (r 5 0.704; p < 0.001; N 5 311). Intuitively, judges have no obvious reason to give victims who lost more earning capacity higher pain and suffering damages, once judges have accounted for the severity of the victims' injuries. Another reason for the insignificance of lost earning capacity might be that the percentage of lost earning capacity is ascertained in only about 17 percent of our observations, so we do not have sufficient statistical power to sort out its effect. Finally, the number of years of permanently lost earning capacity is highly correlated with the victim's age, but because not all victims work or claim lost income, the number of observations that contains years of lost earning capacity is not large. The statistical insignificance of this variable might be attributed to the lack of statistical power. Below we will demonstrate that the victim's age is sometimes a statistically significant variable.
D. Other Variables of Interest
Other than plaintiffs' comparative negligence, none of the variables besides medical expenses and injury levels are consistently statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 46 We discuss three interesting aspects of the empirical results below.
A few words regarding optimal deterrence here. Shavell (2004:240) notes that to attain optimal deterrence, courts may award expected losses if they cannot ascertain actual losses in individual cases. If judges aim to award expected losses (and largely ignore the variation of facts across cases), in cases where pecuniary damages are low, courts might be inclined to award higher pain and suffering damages, so that the overall compensation awards would be similar across cases, creating specific deterrence for the tortfeasors. By contrast, if judges aim to award actual losses, low pecuniary damages would often come with low nonpecuniary damages, as victims in those cases may not have been seriously injured. Our dataset suggests that judges in Taiwan appear to aim for compensating victims for their actual losses. The Pearson correlation coefficient between pecuniary damages and pain and 45 Avraham (2006:114) has argued that it is unjustified to base pain and suffering damages on incomes. Note also that the Pearson correlation coefficient between natural log of plaintiff incomes and natural log of courtadjudicated medical expenses is only 20.087. Thus, the lack of statistical significance of the plaintiff income variable cannot be attributed to the presence of medical expenses in the model.
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Unreported regression models show that the annual income of both parties does not have statistically significant effects on the amount of pain and suffering damages. We have tried to use both "positive income only" and "positive plus no income" in our models. The results are the same. Note that the annual incomes used in the unreported models here are not necessarily the same as the incomes used in the calculation of lost salary. In the latter, sometimes courts do not use the actual annual income (such as when the victim was not working). Sometimes, victims who are working do not claim for lost salaries.
suffering damages is 0.636 (p < 0.001). Unreported scatterplots and the positive coefficients for medical expenses and nonmedical expenses in Table 3 also provide a consistent story.
Victim's Fault
One interesting issue is whether the victim's own fault influences the amount of pain and suffering damages. In Taiwan, judges take into account the plaintiff's comparative negligence at the end of the damages computation process. That is, the various types of damages are first determined and summed, and then the deduction percentage (the comparative negligence attributed to the victim) is applied across the board. 47 The plaintiff's comparative negligence thus reduces both her pecuniary and her pain and suffering damages. Figure 4 shows the relation between pain and suffering damages and the percent of negligence attributed to the plaintiff (0-75 percent in our dataset). It does not show a strong association between the two, but the positive slope of the line is puzzling. It is counterintuitive for judges to increase the amount of pain and suffering damages when the victim herself is more at fault. The regression models reported in Tables 3 and 4, however, confirm the figure; the comparative negligence variable is statistically significant and is consistently positive.
The bunching of observations at zero fault for plaintiffs led us to explore models that also included a dummy variable that equals 0 when the plaintiff's fault was nonzero and 1 when it was zero. Neither the zero-fault dummy variable nor the fault variable are statistically significant. Nevertheless, in the regression model that contains only the 123 observations in which plaintiffs are at fault, the fault variable is still statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Perhaps the cases with highest plaintiff fault resulted in more pain and suffering that is not captured by our injury-related variables. Negligence by the defendant and substantial negligence by the victim might lead to worse results than in cases in which the victim is modestly negligent or not negligent.
Another possible explanation arose in a round-table discussion with several of Taiwan's most experienced judges. A few judges suggested that judges may be compassionate toward the tort victim and, despite the victim's own fault, be unwilling to substantially reduce the postdeduction compensation. Hence, judges may award higher pain and suffering damages than they otherwise would in anticipation of the fault-based reduction. 48 The result of the structural equation model, reported in Table 4 , echoes with this compassion theory: plaintiffs do not claim higher when they are more at fault-it is judges who increase the pain and suffering awards when plaintiffs are more at fault. A caveat, however, is in order. While plaintiffs more or less know whether they are at fault and to what extent they are comparatively negligent, they cannot accurately predict their levels of court-adjudicated fault. We use the court-adjudicated fault in the plaintiff-claim equation in the structural equation model because there is no other way to ascertain plaintiffs' evaluation of their fault at the time of their claims.
Victim's Age
We discussed above whether the length of enduring pain would influence the amount of the pain and suffering damages. There, the length is measured by the years of lost earning capacity. Here, we use the victim's age as an approximation. The effect of age may vary, depending on the nature of injury. If the injury is persistent, the victims are likely to suffer for the rest of their lives. Their ages are likely to be negatively correlated with the pain and suffering awards, as judges may reason that those with more years ahead of them may feel more total pain over their whole lives. By contrast, provided that the injury is not persistent, after some years victims may adjust to the body impairment and their pain and suffering decreases-this is the psychological theory of adaptation (Sunstein 2008:S191) . The pain and suffering damages thus will not correlate with victims' ages. 49 48 Sharkey (2005:391) hypothesizes an analogous effect when laws cap damages, pointing out that "where noneconomic damages are limited by caps, plaintiffs' attorneys will more vigorously pursue, and juries will award, larger economic damages, which are often unbounded." Our findings to some extent confirm the aforementioned hypothesis. As Figure 5 shows, in serious injury cases, pain and suffering awards are indeed negatively correlated with the victims' ages. When victims suffer from minor injuries, courts appear to have a different approach toward age. In car accident cases, the victims' ages are positively correlated with pain and suffering awards, while in medical malpractice cases, the victims' ages are negatively correlated.
Regression results confirm the scatterplot. In medical malpractice cases, Model (4) in Table 3 shows that age has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. As for car accident cases, Models (1) and (2) in Table 3 show that victim ages and the interaction term of ages and serious injury are not statistically significant. The signs of the age variable and the interaction term are positive and negative, respectively.
The puzzle lies with the different effects of age. In car accident cases, no matter whether the victims suffered minor or serious injuries, their ages have no statistically significant effect. It appears that judges subscribed to the adaptation theory, perhaps believing that even victims who suffer from persistent pain (more likely to correlate with serious injuries in our coding) would return to the preinjury hedonic level in a few years. This would be counterevidence to "adaptation neglect" (Sunstein 2008:158) . In medical malpractice cases, adaptation theory cannot explain the results. There, judges appeared to believe that pain and suffering will never subside, thus total expected life matters. Hence, younger victims were given more pain and suffering damages. Our data, with many missing values, do not enable us to fully untangle this puzzle.
Car Accident Versus Medical Malpractice
Car accident cases and medical malpractice cases exhibit different patterns. Figure 1 and unreported statistics show that the mean, median, and 25th and 75th percentiles of pain and suffering damages in the medical malpractice cases are higher than those in the car accident cases. The case type dummy variable in our regression model (Model (1) in Table 3 ) is statistically significant, again suggesting that, other things being equal, the medical malpractice cases are associated with more pain and suffering damages. Avraham (2006:95) has conjectured that victims in car accident cases might receive less pain and suffering damages than those in medical malpractice cases because being injured in a special relationship causes more pain. As Koehler and Gershoff (2003) find, human beings are "betrayal averse." Medical doctors are "agents of protection." When doctors mistreat patients and become "agents of harm," people feel more painful toward the injury than the same level of injury incurred without betrayal. This conjecture is borne out by our data. The structural equation model reported in Table 4 provides a more nuanced explanation: the different pain and suffering awards are mainly driven by plaintiffs' claims; that is, plaintiffs claim more pain and suffering damages in medical malpractice cases. More specifically, the total effect is the sum of the direct effect and the indirect effect-the direct effect measures the influence of a variable directly on court awards, whereas the indirect effect measures the influence of a variable on court awards through its influence on the plaintiff's request (Freese & Kevern 2013:31) . The medical malpractice dummy variable has strong total and indirect effects but a weak direct effect. This suggests that plaintiffs take into account the case type in claiming pain and suffering damages. The weak direct effect suggests that judges do not disagree with plaintiffs' judgments regarding the effect of case type on pain and suffering damages. The highly statistically significant total effects suggest that case types ultimately influence the court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages.
E. Pain and Suffering Damages as a Percentage of Total Damages
The prior literature on pain and suffering damages and the literature on the relation between ordinary damages and punitive damages have focused on the percentage of "subjective" damages (i.e., the pain and suffering damages or the punitive damages) in total damages. Figure 6 contains two sets of box plots in which the horizontal line represents the median value of the percentage of damages consisting of pain and suffering damages and the boxes show the interquartile range. The left-hand box plots show the pain and suffering award as a percentage of the combined pain and suffering award plus medical expenses. The right-hand box plot shows pain and suffering awards as a percentage of the total award.
For car accident cases, the median percentage of pain and suffering damages in relation to medical expenses is about 70 percent and the 25th percentile is near 50 percent. So, in about 75 percent of the cases, the pain and suffering damages exceed the medical expenses. For medical malpractice cases, the median percentage of pain and suffering damages in relation to medical expenses is over 90 percent and the 25th percentile is over 70 percent. In almost all the medical malpractice cases, the pain and suffering damages exceed the medical expenses. The right-hand box plot in Figure 6 indicates that, for car accidents, in about 50 percent of the cases, pain and suffering damages exceed pecuniary damages (including nonmedical expenses and lost salary). In medical malpractice cases, pain and suffering damages exceed pecuniary damages in about 90 percent of the cases. Section V discusses the results in comparison to U.S. results. 228 Chang et al.
V. Relation to U.S. Trial Outcomes
We have information about the relation between pain and suffering damages and pecuniary loss, as shown across the range of pecuniary loss in Figure 2 and as summarized in Figure 6 . Given the attention devoted to the behavior of U.S. juries with respect to pain and suffering damages payments, it is of interest to compare the outcome of Taiwan trials to that of U.S. trials. Doing so requires using a dataset that contains reasonably detailed information on U.S. trial outcomes. Data that specifically focus on pain and suffering awards are rare (Avraham 2006 ), so we use a dataset that reports on economic and noneconomic damages, of which pain and suffering damages are the major component. The U.S. dataset for this part of our study comes from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, a National Center for State Courts-Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) project that has yielded four major datasets. The Civil Justice Survey gathered data directly from state court clerks' offices on tort, contract, and property cases disposed of by trial in fiscal year [1991] [1992] We extracted from the 2005 data information about economic damages and noneconomic damages for automobile accident cases and medical malpractice cases, the two case categories in the Taiwan data. Given the concern about the high fractions of damages in the United States that consist of pain and suffering awards (Bovbjerg et al. 1988:207-08; Avraham 2006) , it is interesting to compare the percentages of damages 50 For a summary of the data and methodology, see Bureau of Justice Statistics (1995, 1996, 2004) . The initial Civil Justice Survey dataset (1991--1992) includes only jury trials. The two subsequent datasets, 1996 and 2001, include jury and bench trials. The three datasets include all completed trials in all three years in most of the counties.
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For a summary of the data and methodology, see Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008) and Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (2009). that consist of pain and suffering awards in the Taiwan trials data with the fractions of damages that consist of noneconomic damages in the U.S. trials data. Panel A of Table  5 reports the results for automobile cases and Panel B reports the results for medical malpractice cases. For the BJS data, we report results separately for judge trials and for jury trials.
To those who attribute to U.S. juries unusually high percentages of damages awards that consist of noneconomic damages, the results should be startling. Professional judges in Taiwan's civil-law system do not award meaningfully lower noneconomic damages as fractions of recoveries than do U.S. juries. 52 Even within the United States, the table provides no evidence of meaningful differences between judges and juries. Too few U.S. judge-adjudicated medical malpractice cases exist to support inferences about that category of cases, but the other table rows contain a reasonable number of cases.
Other differences between the two legal systems caution against hasty conclusions based on the two countries' data. For example, to the extent that the measure of noneconomic damages in the U.S. data includes components other than pain and suffering, 53 the percentage of U.S. awards that consist of pain and suffering is systematically lower than the percentages in Table 5 . This suggests that pain and suffering awards by Taiwan judges likely are a higher percentage of total damages than are pain and suffering awards by U.S. juries and judges. 54 On the other hand, Taiwan's national health-care system covers most routine medical treatments and medication (see Section II), so the medical expense portion of pecuniary damages in Taiwan likely is lower than that portion of pecuniary damages in the United States for similar injuries. The relatively lower medical expenses tend to make pain and suffering damages a higher percentage of total damages than in the United States. Put differently, the percentage of Taiwan awards that consist of pain and suffering would be, again, systematically lower than the percentages in Table 5 if the tortfeasors have to pay to the victims the medical expenses covered by the national health-care system. Despite these and other systemic differences, our results are evidence suggesting the absence of dramatic differences in the percentages of noneconomic damages awarded in the two countries. 
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Pain and suffering awards were found to not constitute a high proportion of awards in Illinois medical malpractice cases (Vidmar et al. 2006) . Similarity extends to another important feature of damages, the relation between noneconomic damages and economic damages. Figure 7 contains scatterplots of that relation for the Taiwan and U.S. data. The first row's graphs cover automobile accident cases and the second row's graphs cover medical malpractice cases, with U.S. cases again separated by judge and jury trial. Each subfigure also shows the best-fitting regression line from a simple regression of noneconomic damages as a function of economic damages. To facilitate comparison, the figure shows the Taiwan damages in USD and uses common x and y scales for all graphs. Figure 7 confirms strong associations between economic and noneconomic damages in the datasets. All scatterplots, except that of five medical malpractice judge-tried cases, suggest a significant positive relation between economic and noneconomic damages. As noted in our discussion of the Taiwan case results, increasing noneconomic damages likely reflect greater noneconomic losses being associated with greater pecuniary harm, or anchoring on the pecuniary loss, or a combination of the two. Simple regression models, reported in Table 6 , confirm the figure's impression. Each model contains a single explanatory variable, economic damages, and either noneconomic damages (U.S. data) or pain and suffering damages (Taiwan data) as the dependent variable.
The coefficients for medical malpractice cases across the datasets are reasonably consistent, as shown in Panel B of Figure 7 . 55 But, as suggested by Figure 7 's second row, substantially less of the variance is explained in the jury-tried medical malpractice cases. 56 Among the three groups, coefficients substantially and significantly differ, with large differences in the variance in noneconomic damages explained. Figure 7 and Table 6 also show differences between the countries. U.S. awards are consistently higher. Part of this difference may be due to differences in general economic conditions. Taiwan's 2012 per-capita purchasing power was about 74 percent that of the United States.
57 Almost no Taiwan awards exceed USD 1 million and several are less than USD 100. The U.S. data have awards above $1 million and no awards less than $100.
58
Panel A shows that the coefficient for economic damages is much smaller in Taiwan cases, suggesting a lesser increase in pain and suffering damages per unit increase in economic damages than in U.S. cases. Figure 7 's first row shows this difference in slopes. This difference persists in median regression models, which reduce the influence of the large U.S. awards. The increased slope is not limited to U.S. juries as the slopes for the U.S. decisionmakers are similar and do not significantly vary (note again the small N of courtadjudication cases in the United States) (for similar finding, see Hans & Reyna 2011) . The higher slope may be attributed to U.S. noneconomic damages in the BJS data including components other than pain and suffering. Also, U.S. juries may be concerned that a third or so of the damages will be paid to contingent-fee attorneys; thus, they up the ante when determining the awards. By contrast, attorneys in Taiwan collect fixed fees (Chang & Tu 2016) ; thus, even compassionate judges do not have to be concerned with attorney fees.
VI. Conclusion
Concerns have been expressed in Taiwan about the variability of damages for pain and suffering. We show that in car accident and medical malpractice cases, these damages are strongly correlated with measurable quantities and are not numbers randomly generated by judges. The amount expended for medical expenses and the level of injury are two key variables that explain much of the pain and suffering award. We also provide evidence that the requested amount influences the awarded amount beyond the important objective influences on awards. Judicial anchoring on the plaintiff's requested amount may increase pain and suffering awards beyond the amount forecast by observable variables. Evidence of the basic rationality of pain and suffering damages has implications beyond Taiwan. In the United States, concerns about damages for pain and suffering damages have led to many statutes capping damages. Caps on damages are likely to 56 New York County and Cook County were the only two counties with more than six jury-tried medical malpractice cases won by plaintiffs.
57
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database-October 2013 , accessed Dec. 24, 2013 Nevertheless, median car awards in Taiwan are comparable to those in the United States: USD 17,000 in 2012 dollars compared to USD 15,000 in the United State in 2005 dollars in the BJS study. reduce access to counsel, given the reduced expected recoveries (Garber et al. 2009 ). In the classes of cases studied in the two countries, we show that noneconomic damages in the United States do not constitute a higher percentage of the total damages award than do pain and suffering damages in Taiwan. Given the evidence of rationality of the Taiwanese system, this should reduce concerns based on the substantial portion of damages consisting of pain and suffering damages in the United States (e.g., Viscusi 1988:207) . Both countries' systems show strong associations between noneconomic damages and economic damages. Reform proposals in both countries should be considered in light of the consistent evidence of rationally functioning systems.
Concerns about pain and suffering damages in Taiwan and the United States should also be considered in light of data from other countries. Karapanou and Visscher (2010a) compare pain and suffering awards from European country cases with amounts that might be awarded if a metric from health-care economics, quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), were used. 59 QALYs are based on surveys of people in various health conditions. QALYs in two states of health can be compared to quantify the difference between two states. Karapanou and Visscher (2010a) employed a conservative approach to monetize differences in health conditions based on QALYs, which they use to monetize pain and suffering. They compare their conservative estimates for amputations, spinal injuries, and deafness to awards in court cases from Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands. They conclude that pain and suffering damages in Europe are systematically too low-in our parlance, unreasonable. Policymakers should seriously study QALYs or other metrics that could set reasonable and predictable pain and suffering damages. Lastly, our Taiwan data are a product of judges' behavior; U.S. data come from both judges and juries. Given the tendency of the media and policymakers to focus on U.S. juries, some similarities are worth noting. Taiwan judges, U.S. judges, and U.S. juries all produce strong statistically significant associations between noneconomic damages and economic damages. The three sets of decisionmakers also produce reasonably similar percentages of total awards that consist of noneconomic damages. Policy recommendations based solely on data relating to juries that recommend reducing their responsibility (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1998 ) omit the relevant comparison group, judges.
